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BOOK REVIEWS
The Art of Advocacy. By Lloyd Paul Stryker.
and Schuster, 1954. Pp. 306. $5.00.

New York: Simon

This book is an excellent plea for the art of advocacy. It is interestingly written by one who had something to tell. Mr. Stryker
demonstrates a keen insight into our system of jurisprudence and draws
from a rich background of learning and experience to develop a volume
designed to inspire the lawyer and would-be lawyer to achieve proficiency in the Art of Advocacy. For the lay reader the author seeks
to create and increase appreciation for the advocate and his art.
The work is an outgrowth of a series of lectures by the author
before the Yale Law School. From these materials Mr. Stryker in
Part One moves through The Trial from the arrival of a new case to
the closing speech. Addressing himself to the student lawyer, he makes
a plea for the advocate and his art, combining materials to inspire with
materials to instruct.
Although recognizing that for the advocate there is no substitute
for experience, the author attempts to pass on to his reader helpful instruction. For those who would learn by methods less expensive to
their clients than experience, he has many suggestions. At no time,
however, does his work resemble a manual of techniques. The tone
is higher. It is inspirational.
Mr. Stryker's language and style leaves the reader with no doubt
that he has been with a master advocate. Illustrative is his description
of a cross examination of a witness by John McIntyre, one of his
teachers in the school of experience:
"He laid his questions on with a lash. They were as sharp
and pointed as a dart, as ensnarling as a harpoon, as lethal as a
rifle, and as businesslike as a machine gun."
The author calls attention to some of the many imponderables that
go to make up a jury verdict and gives helpful suggestions on how
to handle them to advantage. Every lawyer worthy of the privilege
to practice in court is aware that jury verdicts are influenced by many
seemingly insignificant happenings and occurrences during the course
of the trial. The good trial lawyer must become a master at recognizing
such incidents and occurrences and must utilize them to bring about a
favorable verdict.
Mr. Stryker does not overlook the importance to the advocate of
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a knowledge of the law. It is believed that others making a specialty
in trial work have made this mistake. Such neglect accounts in part
for the low state of advocacy in this country so deplored by the author.
To North Carolina lawyers, the great majority of whom practice
in small towns and county seats, this book is a valuable contribution.
Although Mr. Stryker follows the New York practice in moving
through The Trial, his inspirational instruction on the art of crossexamination and the effective use of the closing speech will find practical application by North Carolina lawyers.
The author's concern for the state of advocacy now existing is more
than an aged person's lament of changing conditions. It is a constructive criticism of our modern institutions of legal education and lawyer
training. Although the modem law schools have a reputation for preparing lawyers only for practice in the appellate courts, Mr. Stryker
finds a low state of advocacy here also. By using illustrations from
his personal experience and by drawing from materials of that master
of appellate practice, John W. Davis, he gives a lesson in appellate
advocacy. These lessons are worthy of study by all who practice in
the appellate courts. Oral argument in the appellate courts can be of
great assistance to the court. If Mr. Davis' decalogue for arguments
were followed by the advocate, no appellate court would consider changing its rules to eliminate the oral argument.
Mr. Stryker quotes from the late Justice Robert H. Jackson to point
up the importance of the advocate in our system of government:
"In this Country the administration of justice is based on law
practice. Paper rights are worth when threatened just what
some lawyer makes them worth. Civil liberties are those which
some lawyer respected by his neighbor will stand up to defend."
(Italics ours.)
As for the ethics of the advocate, he must be one worthy of absolute confidence. He must never forget that he is not only the servant
of his client but also the friend and officer of the court.
To the real lawyer who will not be stopped when the controversy
gpes to court, this book is a valuable contribution.
CYRus F. LEE

Member North Carolina Bar
Wilson, North Carolina
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Supreme Court and Supreme Law: An Interpretation. Edited by
Edmond Cahn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954.
Pp. ix, 250. $4.00.
How to appraise the results of 150 years in the history of an idea,
how to make value judgments of the effectiveness of an institution or
of a doctrine in the present American scene or at some period in the
past-these were the difficult questions which faced Professor Edmond
Cahn and his collaborators in their meetings at New York University
School of Law in 1953 by way of observing the 150th anniversary of
Marbury v. Madison. As stated by Mr. Cahn, the editor of Supreme
Court and Supreme Law, the questions to which he and his collaborators addressed themselves were: "What practical, working difference
does judicial review make in the contempory American scene? Has
the Supreme Court exercised its power to determine constitutionality
too extensively or too narrowly, with wisdom or imprudently? By
passing on the validity of laws and executive actions, in what directions
does the Court turn the dynamic force of the Constitution ?" (p. vii)
The experts gathered to find answers to these questions, "to take
stock of the institution of judicial review in its major functioning aspects," are Edmond Cahn, Professor of Jurisprudence and of Constitutional Law at New York University and author of The Sense of
Injustice; Ralph Bischoff, Paul Freund, John P. Frank and Willard
Hurst, members of the faculties of the Law Schools of New York University, Harvard, Yale and Wisconsin, respectively, and Charles P.
Curtis, member of the Boston Bar and author of Lions under the
Throne. These men are especially qualified for this salutary job of
stock-taking concerning the institution of judicial review in those aspects
most important for the functioning of the government of the United
States under the Constitution, involving, as stock-taking does, an appreciation of the importance of the past in arriving at an understanding
of the present and a projection of the future.
The volume is a collection of five leading articles: (1) the introduction by Professor Cahn, An American Contribution, (2) Review
and Federalism by Professor Freund, (3) Review and Basic Liberties
by Professor Frank, (4) Review and the Distribution of National
Powers by Professor Hurst and (5) Review and Majority Rule by
Mr. Curtis. The introductory article by Professor Cahn is immediately
followed by a series of short papers and discussions, taken verbatim
from the proceedings of the Conference, on two practical procedural
problems: (1) Conditions and Scope of Constitutional Review, wherein are discussed Status to Challenge Constitutionality, Political Questions, and Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases; (2) The Process
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of Constitutional Construction, wherein are discussed The Role of History, The Role of Constitutional Text, and The Role of Official Precedents. The volume concludes with notes to the various articles and
papers, a list of cases referred to and a good index.
Mr. Cahn's introduction is a philosophical essay on Marbury v.
Madison and the doctrine of judicial review as the American solution
to a written constitution. Historically, according to Mr. Cahn, the
theory of a written constitution was that it was permanent and immutable and inspired. John Locke's The Fundamental Constitutions
of Carolina-1669 is used by way of illustration, with its conclusion
that "These fundamental constitutions, in number a hundred and twenty, and every part thereof, shall be and remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina forever."
For this concept, Marbury v. Madison substituted a theory of a
written constitution as an effective instrument of government, adaptable
to the changes and developments of the social order by the judgment
of the courts. This fundamental change of emphasis, not new with
John Marshall, was consummated by him in Marbury v. Madison. The
final paragraph of Mr. Cahn's essay, summarizing this thesis, calls for
quotation:
"Marbury v. Madison has proved to be one of those very
special occurrences that mark an epoch in the life of the republic.
Culminating the great achievements of the Constitutional Period,
it accomplished the transition from perpetuity to efficacy, from
immutability to adaptation, and from heavenly to judicial sanctions. Finally, it introduced an unending colloquy between the Supreme Court and the people of the United States, in which the
Court continually asserts, 'You live under the Constitution but
the Constitution is what we say it is,' and the people incessantly
reply, 'As long as your version of the Constitution enables us to
live with pride in what we consider a free and just society, you
may continue exercising this august, awesome, and altogether
revocable authority.'" (p. 25)
Review and Federalism deals with the Supreme Court's function
in our federal system as the scales which balance the competing interests of state and nation in various areas of our economy and our
society, in allocating certain activities to the states and others to the
nation, in deciding what interests should prevail where state and nation
claim to regulate or tax in the same area, in short, in maintaining the
United States as a nation under a federal constitution. Professor
Freund concludes that the Supreme Court has done well in accommo-
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dating the interests of the states and the national government, and
especially in the review of acts of Congress under the commerce power.
Professor Freund makes a suggestion that might be in improvement
on judicial review in the field of state taxation of interstate enterprise, i.e., Congress might set up a special tribunal with rule making
powers to determine the applicability of state taxation of interstate
enterprise.
In the essay on Review and Basic Liberties, John Frank finds
dissatisfaction with what the Supreme Court has done in protecting
civil liberties against restraining legislation by Congress. "At best, I
repeat, judicial review is, so far as civil liberty is concerned, a near
failure." (p. 131) Mr. Frank makes several proposals, all within the
Court's purview, by which the protection afforded basic liberties might
be improved. He suggests that the fact that the Supreme Court exists
and is present in Washington, has had a restraining influence on proposed anti-civil rights legislation. Members of Congress, like most
of their constituents, believe that, when called upon, the Supreme
Court will protect the citizen's basic liberties, although the record, as
pointed out by Mr. Frank in the cases of judicial review of Acts of
Congress, does not seem to justify this firmly fixed belief.
Professor Hurst's provocative essay Review and the Distribution
of National Powers (separation of powers) makes clear the very great
effect on national policy that the Supreme Court exercises through
statutory interpretation, but not so much through judicial review of
Acts of Congress. On the other hand, it is pointed out that in many
respects, such as the significant problem of civil control of the military,
judicial review will have little effect compared with excutive decision,
as in President Truman's recall of General MacArthur, for example.
Professor Hurst's conclusion that the Supreme Court's influence on
policy making and policy execution is not very important may come
as a surprise to many, but Professor Hurst, excellent historian that he
is, makes a convincing case. He sees judicial review as safeguarding
the position of the individual in the application of law, rather than in
the surveillance of general policy making. As in Mr. Frank's essay,
there is an emphasis on the protection of civil liberties by the courts
and a doubt as to the efficacy of the Supreme Court in dealing with restraining legislation by Congress or in restraining the practices of Congressional investigating committees.
The essay by Mr. Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, is a companion piece to Professor Cahn's philosophical essay on the origins
and nature of judicial review. Mr. Curtis further develops the thesis
that the Court is the agency that permits us to change and grow while
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living under a written constitution. "Marbury v. Madison opened the
way for the Court to take upon itself the function of interpreting and
declaring our immemorial immanent law." (p. 192) When the Court
finds this "immanent component in our constitutional law" (p. 184),
its decisions become the implicit will and conscience of the majority.
All this echoes back to natural law and natural rights.
In the shorter papers and discussions, there is some of the keenest
observation and criticism of judicial review. But this remarkable group
of essays, papers and discussions must be read to be appreciated. This
reviewer would urge the reading. Professor Cahn and his five collaborators have performed that difficult task of interpretation and evaluation of an institution and doctrine with which most American citizens
have a speaking acquaintance, but which is understood by so few.
ROBERT

School of Law
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
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